Equality Bill - Standing Committee A

[Mr. Roger Gale in the Chair]

Equality Bill

Roger Gale: I am sure that we will move through the business rapidly this morning. Hon. Members will note that the Selection list contains a sequence of clauses with no proposed amendments. It is my custom and practice to call each clause by number in sequence until someone shouts a number back at me. Then, I will stop, move all previous clauses, and call a stand part debate on the one called. I do not propose to have a stand part debate on every clause unless hon. Members indicate that that is what they want.

Clause 11 - Monitoring the law

Eleanor Laing: I beg to move amendment No. 75, in clause 11, page 6, line 29, leave out paragraph (c).
We want to delete paragraph (c) because it is unnecessary.

Meg Munn: Clause 11 imposes a duty on the new Commission for Equality and Human Rights to monitor the effectiveness of equality of human rights legislation as defined in clause 33. It also gives it the power to recommend changes to such legislation.
As clause 33 lists equality legislation largely to identify the legislation for which the commission will have enforcement functions, it mentions only part 2 of and regulations made under part 3 of the Bill, thus capturing the provisions on substantive discrimination. Subsection 3(c) provides that for the purposes of monitoring the law, the whole Act will be included, including part 1, which deals with the establishment and powers of the commission and the list of equality and human rights enactments to which the commission’s enforcement powers apply.
The amendment would effectively remove the commission’s duty to monitor the effectiveness of thed¤provisions in part 1 and its power to recommend to the Government the amendment, repeal, consolidation or application of the legislation in respect of part 1. If we were to accept the amendment, the commission would be prevented from doing something that the three current commissions—the Commission for Racial Equality, the Disability Rights Commission and the Equal Opportunities Commission—can do. They can recommend changes to their own powers. Indeed, in its 1998 report to the  Government the CRE called for the power to enter into a binding agreement with a party it suspected of having breached the Race Relations Act 1976.
The amendment would deprive the Government of a rich source of advice and counsel. That is not reasonable. Nor is it reasonable to deprive the commission of powers that are available to the current commissions. Therefore, I cannot accept the amendment and ask the hon. Lady to withdraw it.

Eleanor Laing: I thank the Minister for that comprehensive explanation as to the necessity of the paragraph. I accept her argument and therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12 - Monitoring progress

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Meg Munn: It will be helpful if I explain a little about the clause. There is a wide range of issues for the commission to tackle if it is to play its part in shaping a society characterised by social justice, strong communities and a prosperous economy. Achieving those outcomes will require action in a broad range of areas, not just by the commission, but by many others in state and civil society.
Securing equality, challenging prejudice, promoting human rights and strengthening communities will require more than singular or narrow approaches and long-term commitment. To achieve those outcomes, we need greater clarity regarding the nature of the barriers to progress, the changes necessary and the measures by which we can evaluate the progress that we have made. The commission’s duty to identify those outcomes and track progress toward them through clearly defined indicators is at the heart of the clause. In some areas of equality and human rights there will certainly and rightly be debate about the outcomes that we seek and the ways in which the outcomes can most effectively be measured.
The clause places the commission under a duty to consult widely on outcomes and indicators. An objective and robust analysis of that sort is important for two reasons. First, if we are to make progress in the areas of equality and human rights, we need to agree the nature of the problems that face us and the most effective solutions for addressing them. Building consensus on that basis and developing a wider debate across Britain is essential to deepen our shared understanding and identify the priorities. Secondly, such a report will provide a sound evidence base from which the commission can determine its strategic priorities and focus its efforts. The commission will have to make tough decisions about its priorities and will need to identify where needs are most acute and where it is likely to have the most impact. In order to do that priority setting well, it will need a credible  starting point, which is provided by the “State of the Nation” report, which has been the subject of discussion. That is why I wanted to go into this matter a little more.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 - Codes of practice

Sandra Gidley: I beg to move amendment No. 38, in clause 14, page 7, line 38, at end insert—
‘( )sections [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities], [Age discrimination: specific duties of public authorities] and [Age discrimination: specific duties (Scotland)] of this Act,’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment No. 39, in clause 14, page 8, line 40, after ‘76C’, insert
‘, [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities], [Age discrimination: specific duties of public authorities] and [Aged¤discrimination: specific duties (Scotland)].’.
New clause 3—Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities—
‘(1)A public authority shall in carrying out its functions have due regard to the need to—
(a)eliminate unlawful discrimination and harrassment on grounds of age,
(b)promote equality of opportunity between persons of different ages, and
(c)promote good relations betwen persons of different ages.
(2)In subsection (1)—
(a)“public authority” includes any person who has functions of a public nature (subject to subsections (3) and (4)),
(b)“functions” means functions of a publice nature, and
(c)the reference to unlawful discrimination shall be treated as including a reference to contravention of terms of contracts having effect in accordance with Schedule 5 to the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006.
(3)The duty in subsection (1) shall not apply to—
(a)the House of Commons,
(b)the House of Lords,
(c)the Scottish Parliament,
(d)the General Synod of the Church of England,
(e)the Security Service,
(f)the Secret Intelligence Service,
(g)the Government Communications Headquarters,
(h)a part of the armed forces of the Crown which is, ind¤accordance with a requirement of the Secretary of State,d¤assisting the Government Communications Headquarters, or
(i)a person specified for the purposes of this paragraph by order of the Secretary of State (and a person may be specified generally or only in respect of specified functions).
(4)The duty in subsection (1) shall not apply to the exercise of—
(a)a function in connection with proceedings in the House of Commons or the House of Lords,
(b)a function in conncection with proceedings in the Scottish Parliament (other than a function of the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body),
(c)a judicial function (whether in connection with a court or a tribunal),
(d)a function exercised on behalf of or on the intructions of a person exercising a judicial tribunal, (whether in connection with a court or a tribunal), or
(e)a function specified for the purposes of this paragraph by order of the Secretary of State.
(5)Subsection (1) (b) is without prejudice to the effect of any exception to or limitation of the law about age discrimination.
(6)A failure in respect of performance of the duty under subsection (1) does not confer a cause of action at private law.
(7)An order under subsection (3)(i) or subsection (4) (e) may not be made unless the Secretary of State has consulted the Commission.
(8)This section binds the Crown.’.
New clause 4—Age discrimination: specific duties of public authorities—
‘(1)The Secretary of State may by order impose on a person to whom the duty in section [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities] (1) applies, or insofar as that duty applies to a person, a duty which he thinks will ensure better performance of the duty under that section.
(2)Before making an order under subsection (1) the Secretary of State shall consult the Commission.
(3)The Secretary of State—
(a)must consult the National Assembly for Wales before making an order under subsection (1) in respect of a person exercising functions in relation to Wales, and
(b)may not, without the consent of the National Assembly for Wales, make an order under subsection (1) in respect of a person all of whose functions are public functions in relation to Wales.
(4)A failure in respect of performance of duty imposed under subsection (1) does not confer a cause of action at private law.’.
New clause 5—Age discrimination: specific duties (Scotland)—
‘(1)Section [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities] (1) shall not apply in relation to a person who is a relevant Scottish authority or a cross-border authority.
(2)The Secretaty of State may by order impose on a cross-border authority to whom the duty under section [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities] (1) applies, or insofar as that duty applies to the cross-border authority, a duty which the Secretary of State thinks will ensure better performance of the duty under section [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities] (1) to the extent that the cross-border authority’s functions are not Scottish functions.
(3)The Scottish Ministers may by order impose on a relevant Scottish authority to whom the duty under section [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities] (1) applies, or insofar as that duty applies to the relevant Scottish authority, a duty which the Scottish Ministers think will ensure better perfomance of the duty under section [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities] (1).
(4)The Scottish Ministers may by order imposer cross-border authority to whom the duty under section [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities] (1) applies, or insofar as that duty applies to the cross-border authority, a duty which the Scottish Ministers think will ensure better performance of the duty under section [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities] (1), to the extent that the cross-border authority’s functions are Scottish functions.
(5)Before making an order under any of subsections (2) to (4) the person making the the order shall consult the Commission.
(6)Before making an order under subsection (2) the Secretary of State shall consult the Scottish Ministers.
(7)Before making an order under subsection (4) the Scottish Ministers shall consult the Secretary of State.
(8)A failure in respect of performance of a duty imposed under this section does not confer a cause of action at private law.
(9)In this section “relevant Scottish authority” has the meaning—
(a)a member of the Scottish Executive or a junior Scottish Minister,
(b)the Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages for Scotland, the Keeper of the Registers of Scotland or the Keeper of the Records of Scotland,
(c)an office of a description specified in an Order in Council under section 126(8) (b) of the Scotland Act 1998 (c.46) (other non-ministerial offices in the Scottish Aministration), or
(d)a public body, public office or holder of a public office—
(i)which is not a cross-border authority or the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body,
(ii)whose function are exercisable only in or as regards Scotland, and
(iii)some at least of whose functions do not relate to reserved matters (within the meaning of the Scotland Act 1998).
(10)In this section—
“cross-border authority” has the meaning a cross-border public authority within the meaning given by section 88(5) of the Scotland Act 1998.
“Scottish functions” has the meaning functions which are exercisable in or as regards Scotland and which do not relate to reserved matters (within the meaning of the Scotland Act 1998).
(11)An order under subsection (3) or (4) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of the Scottish Parliament.’.
New clause 6—Age discrimination: enforcement—
‘(1)This section applies where the Commission thinks that a person has failed to comply with a duty imposed under section [Age discrimination: specific duties of public authorities] or [Age discrimination: specific duties (Scotland)].
(2)The Commission may give the person a notice requiring him—
(a)to comply with the duty, and
(b)to give the Commission, within the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which he receives the notice, written information of the steps being taken for the purpose of complying with the duty.
(3)A notice under this section may require a person to give the Commission information required by the Commission for thed¤purposes of assessing compliance with the duty; in which case the notice shall specifiy—
(a)the period within which the information is to be given (which shall begin with the date on which the notice is received and shall not exceed three months), and
(b)the manner and form in which the information is to be given.
(4)A person who receives a notice under this section shall comply with it.
(5)A notice under this section shall not oblige a person to give information that he could not be compelled to give in proceedings before the High Court or the Court of Session.
(6)If the Commission thinks that a person, to whom a notice under this section has been given, has failed to comply with a requirement of the notice, the Commission may apply to a count court (in England and Wales) or to the sheriff (in Scotland) for an order requiring the person to comply.’.
New clause 7—Age discrimination: codes of practice—
‘(1)The Commission may issue a code of practice about the performance of—
(a)the duty under section [Age discrimination: statutory duty of public authorities] (1), or
(b)a duty imposed under section [Age discrimination: specific duties of public authorities] or [Age discrimination: specific duties (Scotland)].
(2)Section 14 and 15 shall apply to a code under this section,
(3)The Secretary of State shall consult the Scottish Ministers and the National Assembly for Wales before—
(a)approving a draft under section 14 as applied by subsection (2) above, or
(b)making an order under section 14 as applied by subsection (2) above.’.

Sandra Gidley: The amendments and new clauses are an attempt to place a duty on public bodies to promote age equality, which would be enforceable by the commission. The provisions should be workable because they have been transposed from the Government’s drafting regarding the similar duty in relation to gender. All we have to decide is whether we have a commitment to end age discrimination in public services.
The amendments would require organisations in the public to have due regard to equality in all aspects of their work, including employment and the provision of services. Evidence from those parts of the public services that have experimented with voluntary commitments have shown that they simply do not work. The Department of Health introduced a non-statutory standard to root out age discrimination that had some impact, but the Healthcare Commission has concluded that it has not addressed unequal outcomes or ageist attitudes in practice. Clearly, therefore, there should be a legal requirement on public bodies to do that.
In Northern Ireland, a general equality duty has been introduced, which has prompted the involvement of older people in services and has led to a range of improvements in those public services as far as they are concerned. This matter was discussed at some length in the other place, but the disappointing outcome was a proposal that it should form part of the discrimination law review. We believe that it needs to be dealt with sooner. Some legislation is planned for 2006, but that will cover only employment and adult education, so there is a big gap within which the rights of older people are not protected.
The Government must be given some credit for the fact that when the Bill was being drafted, great effort was put into keeping people happy in relation to the existing strands of equality and to ensuring that as many of the current responsibilities as possible were covered in the Bill. Disappointingly, the same does not seem to have happened for the new strands. There are some concerns that age in particular could rapidly become a forgotten strand.
This issue is particularly important because older people are no longer a minority. In the rapidly ageing population, there is a greater duty to take their needs into account. Currently, they are treated almost as a token group. There might be an older people’s forum in most councils, but, usually, no effort is made to involve that forum when developing wider services.
Our proposals would have a number of benefits. For a start, they would allow the involvement of older people and put a duty on public bodies to assess the impact of their policies on older people and monitor their impact. They would ensure that more information was available to older people to make them more fully aware of their rights. Another important factor is that although the public authority may have a duty, in the current climate the private  sector is increasingly used, and funded, by the public sector, so we need an assurance that those services will eventually be subject to the same constraints.
We are all aware of direct discrimination against older people in insurance, employment and access to specialist health treatment. To an extent, those are easy to deal with, but the indirect effects are more insidious. For example, transport providers frequently forget to give special consideration to areas with a high population of older people, but such people are less likely to have cars and will probably need slightly different transport provision.
The closure of community hospitals is thought to have a disproportionate impact on the lives of older people. For example, the Learning and Skills Council has recently started targeting most of its funding at vocational qualification. That has had a huge impact on older people; they are not able to gain access to courses that may be regarded as recreational but which are often the only thing to which they look forward during the week. Courses get them out, meeting people and learning new skills, and that probably has consequent savings for the health service because they do not get depressed.
If another strand of disability is added to the picture, the problems increase. Yesterday, we highlighted pension problems for women and the difficulties of gaining access to disability benefits. I will not rehearse that now; we are all aware that those who develop a disability after the age of 65 are treated much less favourably. I struggle to find a reason why that should not be considered to be discrimination, and if the Government are committed to tackling the problem, we surely need to get on with it rather than kicking it into the long grass once again.

Meg Munn: I thank the hon. Lady for raising the important question of age discrimination. She will be aware that the topic was raised by several Members on Second Reading. The Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member ford¤Stirling (Mrs. McGuire), made it clear that thed¤Government unequivocally condemn age discrimination targeted towards people at the younger or older ends of the age spectrum. I emphasise that aged¤discrimination legislation must deal with discrimination at all ages, and not just older people.
Next December, the age equality employment regulations will come into force; they will prohibit age discrimination in employment and vocational training. More widely, the discrimination law review—it should not be described as being the long grass—is considering the case for extending the scope of the law in that area. The review is being undertaken because, as we are all aware, the current anti-discrimination framework is not perfect. A strong case can be made for moving to a simpler, fairer, more consistent and more effective anti-discrimination framework.
The Bill was never intended to cover all aspects of discrimination. We clearly needed to roll forward the current commissions’ powers and duties. It was not a matter of paying greater attention to existing bodies and the so-called equality strands that they deal with;  we had to ensure that there was no regression in their powers and duties while we brought into being a commission that could deal with the much wider range of discrimination and equality issues that society faces. Age discrimination is a priority for the review, and we are currently examining the case for providing new protection in relation to age.
We recognise the beneficial effect that positive duties on the public sector can have in tackling discrimination and reaching wider equality goals. We therefore share the hon. Lady’s view that we should consider the case for building on the existing duties by extending the frameworks in place for race and being put in place for disability and gender to cover age and other equality issues. Before we can make definitive reform proposals, however, we need to do further work to explore the detailed issues that arise, and that will involve consultation with those who would be affected by changes to the current framework of equality duties.
We are already working with age stakeholders and others to take that work forward, and we made a manifesto commitment to introduce a single equality Bill before the end of this Parliament. We plan to publish a Green Paper in late spring 2006 to set out our initial conclusions on what should be included, and we are very positive about including age provisions where that appears to be the right solution.
It is essential, however, that the necessary work should be done before we make any proposals so that we can ensure that the new measures are appropriately targeted and effective. As we go forward, we need to work through some particularly detailed issues, such as the implications of the wide use of age limits in service provision, to ensure that we prevent new legislation from having unintended consequences. I repeat that age is often an issue in relation to a range of services, at both the younger and older age levels.
While the discrimination law review is being taken forward, we will continue to take action on a number of fronts to ensure that public services are improved and delivered in a way that is sensitive to older people’s needs. The Department is currently working to ensure that human rights considerations are mainstreamed into service delivery and we are improving our awareness of how and where discrimination on multiple grounds impacts on particular groups of older people. The Commission for Equality and Human Rights will also have an important role to play in those issues.
I hope that my comments reassure hon. Members and particularly the hon. Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley) that the Government are absolutely committed to tackling age discrimination and to making age issues central to the commission’s work. However, I have also made the case for why we need more time to assess whether an age equality duty is the right way forward. I hope that the hon. Lady agrees with me and will withdraw the amendment.

Sandra Gidley: I am reassured to some extent, but introducing age discrimination provisions is either the right thing or the wrong thing to do. Clearly, we have to be aware of all the impacts, but such measures  appear to have been introduced with some success in other places. It is disappointing that age discrimination provisions seem to be lagging behind provisions on other issues, and I hope that that does not continue to be the case.
Obviously, I look forward to the publication of the Green Paper. However, we might wish to return to this issue later. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: No. 22, in clause 14, page 8, line 5, after ‘tenants’ insert ‘in England or Wales’.
No. 2, in clause 14, page 8, line 10, leave out
‘circumstances in which it is unreasonable to withhold’
and insert ‘reasonableness in relation to’.
No. 23, in clause 14, page 8, line 19, at end insert—
‘(3A)The Commission may issue a code of practice giving practical guidance to landlords and tenants of houses (within the meaning of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2005 (asp 00)) in Scotland about—
(a)circumstances in which the tenant requires the consent of the landlord to carry out work in relation to the house for the purpose of making the house suitable for the accommodation, welfare or employment of any disabled person who occupies, or intends to occupy, the house as a sole or main residence,
(b)circumstances in which it is unreasonable to withhold that consent,
(c)circumstances in which any condition imposed on the granting of that consent is unreasonable, and
(d)the application in relation to such work of—
(i)sections 28 to 31 and 34(6) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 (asp 10), and
(ii)sections 52, 53 and 64(6) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2005 (asp 00).’.—[Meg Munn.]

Evan Harris: I beg to move amendment No. 91, in clause 14, page 8, line 20, leave out subsection (4).
Subsection (4) provides for the Secretary of State to direct the commission and for the commission to comply. Like me, the Minister will be aware that amendments were tabled in the House of Lords to remove the Secretary of State’s power of compulsion and the commission’s duty to comply with the Secretary of State’s directions in respect of the issuing of codes of practice. As we have heard, the clause enables the commission to issue a code of practice when it feels that that is appropriate, and I have no doubt that it will do so in many cases.
I am aware that clause 15(5) might well have been a late addition. It states:
“The Secretary of State may be order amend section 14 so as to vary the range of matters that codes of practice under that section may address.”
Clause 14(4) refers only to those matters that have been added by the Secretary of State. The explanatory notes are clear in that regard:
“Subsection (4) provides a power for the Secretary of State to direct the CEHR to prepare a code of practice in respect of a matter not currently covered by the clause but which the Secretary  of State expects to add by means of the order-making power provided in clause 15(5) to vary the range of matters on which the CEHR may prepare a code of practice.”
It is not consistent to withdraw the requirement that the commission should comply with the direction of the Secretary of State in respect of everything else and to leave it in just in this area. Clearly, if the Secretary of State feels it necessary to add to this part of the Bill, the commission will take that into account and will decide whether to issue a code of practice, just as it does in respect of other parts of the clause. It should not have to comply with a direction in just one respect. I ask the Minister to accept the amendment in order to ensure that the Bill is consistent.

Meg Munn: I thank the hon. Gentleman for explaining the effect of the amendment. As he said, the Bill previously included a requirement for the CEHR to comply with a direction of the Secretary of State to issue a code in connection with a specified matter. That was amended substantially on Report in the other place in response to calls in that House for the CEHR to have greater independence from Government. All powers for the Secretary of State to direct the commission to exercise its powers were removed. We considered removing altogether a requirement for the CEHR to comply with a direction of the Secretary of State in respect of codes of practice but concluded that that would not be the right thing to do. Instead, we proposed an amendment, which became the subsection that amendment 91 seeks to remove.
Subsection (4) enables the Secretary of State to direct the commission to prepare a code only in respect of matters likely to be the subject of forthcoming legislation which he or she expects to add to the list of legislation on which the commission will be able to prepare a code. The purpose of the direction-making power is to enable the Secretary of State to confer on the commission the power to prepare a code in respect of legislation, which it would not otherwise be able to do until that legislation was complete and had been included in the list at clause 14, by means of an order.
For example, if the Government were to bring forward a public sector duty in respect of one or more of the new strands—as the hon. Member for Romsey proposed—the commission would be able to start the work to prepare a code of practice while the public duty legislation was still undergoing its Parliamentary passage. Subsection (4) does not enable the Secretary of State to direct the CEHR to exercise its powers. It allows the Secretary of State to direct the CEHR to start work in anticipation of the power being conferred by order, enabling it to begin early preparation of a code for forthcoming legislation that can be in place when that legislation comes into force. We consider that business, employers and everybody else required to comply with the legislation will welcome the early production of codes for new legislation.

Evan Harris: I am listening carefully to the Minister, and I note the distinction that she makes. However, the nub of the matter is not necessarily whether subsection (4) should exist—I take her point that one needs to ensure that work can be done before the matter is listed in subsection (1)—but whether “shall comply” is  appropriate, because it is inconsistent. Perhaps “The commission shall have a power to issue a code of practice following a direction from the Secretary of State” might be an alternative way of achieving that. Would she consider that approach?

Meg Munn: I have explained why we believe that ours is the right approach. Hon. Members often ask for issues to be brought forward urgently and addressed quickly, and not kicked into the long grass, as the hon. Member for Romsey said. We understand that when we want people to do new things in new areas, we need to move as quickly as possible. The processes of introducing legislation, writing codes of practice and setting dates of enactment can be lengthy and often not understandable to people outside Parliament who think that when Parliament has made a decision for something to happen, it should happen right away. The subsection enables us to ensure that that happens and that, for example, when we bring in a new public sector duty on age that work can begin. At the moment, we are consulting on the public sector gender duty, which is not yet part of our legislation. We have been able to work with the Equal Opportunities Commission to move that forward.

Evan Harris: I am not sure that the hon. Lady is addressing my point. She said that the subsection enables us to ensure that this practice can begin, not that it definitely will. The wording of the subsection implies compulsion in that area but there is no compulsion for the rest. Clearly, if the Minister is keen that the commission should not be held back, it does not necessarily require the need to comply, just the ability. That is the distinction.

Meg Munn: The hon. Gentleman is not, I believe, a lawyer, and indeed neither am I. My guidance is that if the subsection said “may comply” it would not be a direction-making power. It would be a request by the Secretary of State and would therefore not confer the power. I hope that the hon. Gentleman can agree that the requirement for the commission to comply with the direction of the Secretary of State to prepare a code on a matter on which it does not have powers but will in the future is a sensible one. It will be used sensibly to ensure that codes of practice are in place with the coming into effect of new equality legislation. I hope that he will agree to withdraw his amendment.

Evan Harris: I listened carefully to what the Minister said, and will deal with her last point, if I may. We are going in a circle, because the wording that I am not happy with talks about a direction rather than a request and she argues that the words “shall comply” are required in order for the direction to be a direction and not a request. I am arguing that the rest of the ability of the commission to issue a code of practice is on the basis of requests or its own initiative and not on the basis of having to comply. The two questions are therefore the same. Maybe subsection (4) should state “may comply with a request from the Secretary of State.” To argue the need for “shall comply” on the basis of the word direction is a case of chicken and egg, to a certain extent.
I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote. However, I do not feel that the Minister has fully answered the why a direction is necessary here, when issuing codes of practice under subsection (1) is not subject to direction. I understand that the commission needs to be given that power and that my amendment is not appropriate because it deletes the whole subsection. However, there is a question of whether we can return to the subject with a narrower amendment on Report. With that in mind, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: No. 25, in clause 14, page 8, line 46, at end insert—
‘(9)In relation to a code of practice under subsection (3A), the Secretary of State shall consult the Scottish Ministers before—
(a)approving a draft under subsection (6)(a) above, or
(b)making an order under subsection (7)(b) above.’. —[Meg Munn.]

Clause 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15 - Codes of practice: supplemental

Sandra Gidley: I beg to move amendment No. 48, in clause 15, page 9, line 15, leave out from ‘a’ to end of line 18 and insert
‘court or tribunal shall take such a code into account, or any provisions thereof, in any proceedings before it.’.
Clause 15(4) replicates section 47(10) of the Race Relations Act 1976. Our amendment would mean that courts and tribunals would have a duty in future to take the relevant code of practice into account when considering a case. The clause will mean that any court or tribunal would have to consider the code only if it were introduced as evidence by the complainant. That is particularly important given the fact that public funding, which we discussed at some length on Tuesday, is available only for representation in county court or sheriff court cases, not for hearings or employment tribunals, so the vast majority of people taking race discrimination cases to employment tribunals have no legal representation. One hopes that a solicitor would raise the relevant part of the code as evidence, but lay people do not necessarily work in the same way as solicitors, so it is possible that, as they are not so well acquainted with the law, the code would not be introduced as evidence. Given the lack of legal representation, it would be much better if the court or tribunal had an automatic duty to consider the code when judging a case.

Dominic Grieve: I understand what the hon. Lady is trying to do, but quite apart from the Race Relations Act, the form of words used in clause 15(4) is very common in a large amount of legislation in respect of drawing a court’s attention to a code. It applies, for example, in health and safety legislation, where the regulations can be drawn to the attention of a court in civil proceedings even though they are not prescriptive. Although I understand what the hon. Lady is getting at, I am not sure that it would be particularly helpful to require the court to act on the code, because the code’s general  terms may not apply to particular circumstances. I do not share her anxiety that the Government’s wording will somehow mean that the code will not feature in a case. I think that it is clear that the code will feature in a case. All that is required is for someone to say—the court could do this of its own motion—“Well, there’s the code. Let’s look at that to see how it helps us in determining the case.”
If we took the route that the hon. Lady suggests, the provision would become prescriptive and would not be particularly helpful. As I said, the Government’s wording is a well tried formula. I have not encountered the problem of its leading to the code in some way not being relevant to court proceedings. We must bear it in mind that the code will not be able to cover every contingency. From that point of view, it is open to people to say, “Well, the code may say this, but the circumstances of the case are different.” The problem with the amendment is that it could prevent that from happening, which would not necessarily be fair or provide a good solution in the sort of proceedings with which we are dealing.

Meg Munn: I fear that the hon. Gentleman may already have made my points, but I shall still give the hon. Member for Romsey the Government’s explanation as to why the amendment is unnecessary. The drafting in the Bill is designed to carry forward the requirements and legal effect of the Race Relations Act 1976, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Disability Discrimination Act 2005, which oblige a court or tribunal to take a code issued by the relevant existing commission into account in deciding matters before it. I accept that the drafting in clause 15 differs from that in the Acts that I have mentioned, but the legal effect is the same.
Clause 15 provides that a code of practice issued by the Commission for Equality and Human Rights shall be admissible in evidence in criminal or civil proceedings, and that a court or tribunal must take a code of practice into account in any case in which it appears to the court or tribunal to be relevant. However, the code needs to be presented as evidence first. Thereafter, it is for the court to decide whether it is relevant. If the court or tribunal concludes that it is relevant, it is obliged to take the code into account.
A code of practice is designed to ensure or facilitate compliance with a provision of the equality enactments or to promote equality of opportunity. It is expected to describe the ways in which statutory obligations can be met. Therefore, it would be available to parties to a dispute to point to compliance or otherwise with a code of practice as evidence of the intention or otherwise to comply with the legislation.
It would not be practical to require a court or tribunal to take into account a code of practice if it had not been presented as evidence. A court or tribunal may simply not be aware of the full range of codes, so it is incumbent on the parties to bring a code to the attention of the court or tribunal, which they would be likely to do if it lent support to their argument. It is unnecessary and impractical to place a direct  obligation on courts or tribunals to take codes of practice into account in any proceedings before them. Consequently, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw her amendment.

Sandra Gidley: I have listened carefully to the Minister. The amendment was suggested to us by the Commission for Racial Equality, which clearly has concerns that there may be problems with the Bill. At this stage it would probably be more helpful to withdraw the amendment; I will try to find some more examples to aid the debate on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 24, in clause 15, page 9, line 18, at end insert—
‘(4A)Subsection (4)(b) does not apply in relation to a code issued under section 14(3A).’.—[Meg Munn.]

Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 - Grants

Eleanor Laing: I beg to move amendment No. 85, in clause 17, page 10, line 15, after ‘person’, insert ‘body or organisation’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 76, in clause 17, page 10, line 18, after ‘person’, insert ‘or body’.
No. 77, in clause 20, page 10, line 35, after ‘person’, insert ‘or body’.
No. 79, in clause 20, page 11, line 9, after ‘person’, insert ‘or body’.
No. 86, in clause 28, page 16, line 33, after ‘who’, insert ‘or organisation which’.
No. 87, in clause 28, page 16, line 37, after ‘individual’, insert ‘or organisation’.
No. 88, in clause 29, page 18, line 13, after ‘individual’, insert ‘or organisation’.
No. 89, in clause 29, page 18, line 15, after ‘individual’, insert ‘or organisation’.

Eleanor Laing: Clause 17 deals with grants, and clauses 28 and 29, to which some of the amendments in this group relate, deal with legal assistance and its costs. We tabled the amendments to find out whether the Government intend to exclude small organisations or charities from receiving any financial help or assistance to deal with cases brought as a result of the Bill, or possibly by the new commission.
Subsection (1) states:
“In pursuance of any of its duties under sections 8 to 10 the Commission may make grants to another person.”
 We suggest in amendment No. 85 that the commission should be able to make grants to another person, body or organisation. Although I appreciate that “person” has a legal meaning that is much wider than just an individual human being, it does not necessarily include a small charity, small organisation or small business brought into any proceedings as a result of the Bill. This is important because the Bill imposes considerable new duties on, for example, employers, and rightly so—we want to see those duties imposed on employers.
I have always argued—we dealt with this matter at some length on Second Reading—that it would be unfair and counter-productive, and would inhibit the working of the Bill, if small businesses and small employers, even those with just one or two employees, were deterred by the rigour of the legislation from employing anyone who might bring a case under any of the six strands of discrimination that the new commission will examine. That would do the exact opposite of what we intend the legislation and the new commission to do.
One way we can ensure that a small employer, charity or other small body without sufficient funds to have its own legal advice would not be deterred from employing, entering into a contract with or doing business with someone who might be the subject of a discrimination action is to ensure that funding would be available from the public purse for such an action.
Having said that, I return to my recurring theme: we do not want the costs of the commission and of implementing the legislation to impose a greater burden than necessary on the taxpayer. I am not suggesting—far from it—that any of the amendments should be a charter for encouraging litigation or, as I said previously, that any of the provisions should be an open invitation to lawyers to engage in interesting exploration of the meaning and intent of the law. However, such a safeguard in relation to funding would ensure that the right balance was struck. My other recurring theme is that, if we put too many burdens on business, particularly on small business and small organisations, charities and other voluntary organisations, the intent of the Bill will backfire.

James Brokenshire: I want to echo some of the comments made by my hon. Friend, and in particular, to focus on enforcement powers. I want to ensure that by making reference to a “person” the provisions are not restricting the enforcement powers—that those powers will be available to ensure that racism or sexism, for example, is not permitted in certain organisations even if they do not fall within the limited definition of “person”.Similarly, as my hon. Friend said, we obviously want to ensure that the grants given under clause 17 are made available to all persons, in the widest possible sense. I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about the definition of “person”, given its import in relation to subsequent clauses.

Meg Munn: I shall deal first with amendment Nos.d¤85 and 76, which, as the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mrs. Laing) said, seek to extend the power to  make grants to cover both persons and bodies. I consider the amendment to be unnecessary. We have provided a power in clause 17 for the Commission for Equality and Human Rights to make grants to what is termed in the legislation “another person”. As the hon. Lady stated, the term “person” in legislation means not only a natural person, but a legal person—that is to say a body of persons corporate or unincorporate, unless a contrary intention appears. That would include a body, a charity, a company or an organisation, so the additional wording proposed by the amendments is unnecessary. The only group not covered by the term “person” in the Bill is a group of loosely associated people, and I can imagine no circumstance in which the commission would want to make a grant to such a group. [Laughter.] That is probably my only joke of the day, so hon. Members should enjoy it. If the purpose of the amendments is to enable the commission to make grants to firms, charities or other organisations, I can confirm that the Bill permits that, so I cannot accept amendments No.d¤85 and 76.
Amendments Nos. 77 and 79 are similar to amendments Nos. 85 and 76, as they seek to ensure the commission’s investigation power applies to a body as well as a person. The Bill applies that power to a person, and for the reasons that I have just outlined, that would also cover a body or an organisation. I can confirm that the commission can conduct an investigation into a company or other organisation. The amendments are therefore unnecessary and I cannot accept them.
Amendments Nos. 86 to 89 are designed to open up the commission’s power to provide legal support. The Bill enables the commission to support an individual victim of an act of unlawful discrimination or harassment. The amendments seek to enable the commission to support organisations that may become party to proceedings brought under the equality enactments. However, organisations cannot be the victim of unlawful discrimination or harassment. The equality enactments provide protection from discrimination only for individuals. If an organisation could not be a victim, the only way it could be involved in legal proceedings is as a respondent: that is, the party against whom the proceedings are brought. It is not our policy that the commission should support respondents of proceedings.
Hon. Members will doubtless be aware that that matter was discussed at some length at various stages of consideration of the Bill in the other place. Concerns were expressed about proceedings in which the litigant had the full support of the commission against a small firm or a small charity. Baroness Ashton sought to reassure noble Lords that we do not have to fear unreasonable or oppressive action by the commission. The commission will work primarily through promoting good practice and helping bodies comply with the law, fostering constructive links with a wide range of bodies, including small businesses—which have warmly welcomed the commission—and charities. We expect the commission to use its  regulatory powers only rarely, and to support cases brought by individuals in only a few cases, such as to clarify important points of law. I emphasise that the commission will use its powers strategically, and following the precedent of the current commissions, will provide support in only a few cases. Together, the existing commissions support only 200 to 300 cases a year, so the notion of the new commission unfairly bearing down on small organisations is wrong.
 I recognise the possibility that a small organisation could find itself defending an action brought with the commission’s support, but there are checks and balances that ensure that a body in that position isd¤notd¤disadvantaged. Most legal proceedings on discrimination are brought in employment tribunals, which are specifically designed to have straightforward procedures that make formal representation unnecessary. In addition, in both courts and tribunals, clerks, judges or tribunal members would seek to assist in matters of procedure a person who was unrepresented.
Procedures exist to allow the termination of a case brought before a court or tribunal which is vexatious or does not disclose a cause of action. We now have procedures in place in employment tribunals to sift out claims that cannot be substantiated. A tribunal application will be accepted if the aggrieved party has been through the statutory grievance process with the employer, as required by recent reform of employment legislation, maximising the chance of a non-judicial outcome. Similarly, there are also procedures that allow a successful respondent in court to claim the costs of their defence.
Amendments Nos. 88 and 89 would include organisations in the provision of clause 29 for the recovery of costs for assistance in legal proceedings and are consequential to amendments Nos. 86 and 87, so I cannot accept them.
In conclusion, I am not willing to accept amendments Nos. 85, 76, 77 and 79 on the ground that they are legally unnecessary. I cannot accept amendments Nos. 86 and 87 either, because an organisation cannot be a victim of discrimination and the commission can only provide legal support for proceedings brought by victims. It is not our policy to support parties alleged to have discriminated. As I said, the other amendments are consequential to amendments Nos. 86 and 87, so it makes no sense to accept them. I therefore ask the hon. Lady to consider withdrawing her amendment.

Eleanor Laing: I thank the Minister for that explanation and am pleased that she has given us a statement of the Government’s intention. I am willing to accept the definition that she gave of the legal meaning of “person”. As I said, I fully accept that, of course, but it was necessary to clarify the Government’s intention. I appreciate the fact that my noble Friends in another place dealt with the matter at  some length in Committee and gained similar assurances from the Minister there. I am pleased that the matter has also been clarified here, because it is important that fairness be maintained in any proceedings under the Bill.
I know what excellent work is done by the three bodies that will be replaced and what care is given to the selection of matters as possible court or tribunal test cases. It is important that the ability to do that work will continue when the new commission is up and running. I share the Minister’s desire that a group of loosely associated people should not necessarily come under the auspices of the Bill. That is right, and satisfies my continuing theme of ensuring that costs do not escalate. The legitimate bodies that I have in mind, such as small charities and businesses, are not groups of loosely associated people. They are legal persons. I am satisfied that they will be covered by clauses 17, 28 and 29.
I thank the Minister for giving me the reassurance that I sought and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Meg Munn: The power to make grants is presently available only to the Commission for Racial Equality. It has used that power extensively to provide funding for a variety of organisations, including race equality councils, to do innovative work, particularly on local delivery. We have made a commitment that current levels of support for race equality work will be sustained for the foreseeable future. The clause extends grant-making powers across the full remit of the commission and will enable it to provide financial assistance to a wide range of voluntary and other organisations, including those that operate at local level. The commission will be able to use the experience and knowledge gained by those local bodies to inform its work.

Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 - Human rights

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Meg Munn: The clause was raised in discussion of clause 9 and I want to clarify one or two issues. Clause 18 allows the commission to co-operate with other bodies in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in carrying out its human rights duties under clause 9. For example, it would allow the commission to co-operate with the proposed Scottish commissioner for human rights on a joint inquiry on human rights matters covering England, Wales and Scotland. Alternatively, the commission might want to contribute to the  activities of the Council of Europe in raising awareness of the European convention on human rights or the human rights activities of the United Nations.
The clause would, when read alongside the duties set out in clause 9 to encourage good practice on human rights and promote awareness, understanding and protection of human rights, allow the commission to co-operate with bodies that oversee international human rights treaties.

Dominic Grieve: I wonder whether the expression “human rights” is too narrow. Is not it the case that the commission’s remit goes beyond “human rights” as defined in the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention?
I would have expected co-operation with other bodies to be possible on matters relevant to the commission’s activities. By spelling it out expressly that that co-operation will be on human rights issues alone, is there a danger that the clause could be too restrictive?

Meg Munn: I shall regret having spoken on clause stand part. The hon. Gentleman raises an interesting point. However, the Bill’s current purpose is to emphasise the importance of that co-operation. We shall have, for the first time in this country, an institution to support the 1998 Act and to deal with human rights issues, so we wanted to be clear about that in the Bill. His point goes wider than the clause. If he will allow me to write to him, I can deal with his point in more detail.

Roger Gale: Order. I should say to the hon. Lady that, had the point gone wider than the clause, I would have ruled it out of order.

Meg Munn: I accept your ruling, of course, Mr.d¤Gale. My intention was to say that matters elsewhere in the Bill, to which I am unable to respond at present, may deal with the point made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve).

Evan Harris: I wanted to record my thanks to the hon. Lady for making that point. She will be aware that I raised general concerns and asked questions when we discussed clause 9. Indeed, we noted that clause 9 mentions convention rights and other human rights.
I am reassured to a degree that clause 18 will enable the commission, for example, to look at the way in which human rights laws and treaties are evolving outside the UK. It is important for the commission to be able to do that.

Meg Munn: The commission could do that by submitting opinions for consideration in the monitoring of the UK’s performance against its international obligations. That is precisely the task about which the hon. Gentleman asked on Tuesday.
That is an important part of the functions of a national human rights institution, as it will allow the commission to function as an independent monitor of the protection of human rights in the UK. In that respect, it would mostly work with United Nations committees that examine the compliance of the United Kingdom with its obligations under treaties such as the  international covenant on civil and political rights or the convention against torture. We would expect the commission to contribute to that examination process where appropriate. I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that it is already within the commission’s powers to do so.

Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 - Groups

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Evan Harris: I want to ask the Minister to explain what she understands by clause 19(2)(c), which states that the commission may make, co-operate with or assist in arrangements
“for activities (whether social, recreational, sporting, civic, educational or otherwise) designed to involve members of groups.”
“Groups” means those discussed under clause 10.
Presumably, a commission is already doing something like that, and it will want to retain the ability to do so within a new commission. Can the Minister explain what is envisaged by paragraph (c)? I am sure that hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Epping Forest, would not like any public money to be spent frivolously. I would not wish for that either.

Meg Munn: The powers set out in the clause enable the commission to give effect to its duties to promote and encourage good practice between and within groups, which, as the hon. Gentleman has identified, are set out in clause 10.
The powers are in addition to general powers under clause 13 to provide information, advice or guidance, to undertake research and to provide education and training. They are also in addition to powers such as the commission’s ability to carry out inquiries under clause 16 or to make grants under clause 17.
The powers set out in clause 19 provide important mechanisms that are designed to address the changing landscape of community relations in Britain and the challenges that different groups face today. When the Race Relations Act 1976 was enacted, we did not have a very developed understanding of domestic violence or the damaging and tragic legacy of crimes such as Stephen Lawrence’s murder or, indeed, the causes and consequences of the disturbances in northern towns that we witnessed in 2001.
The powers also acknowledge the changed landscape of crime prevention and enforcement. Police forces increasingly work with specific communities to promote community safety by, for example, working with women’s support networks on domestic violence issues or with lesbian and gay communities and organisations on addressing homophobic violence. The Commission for Racial Equality has been running successful “safe communities” pilots that work with communities and  organisations to help to resolve tensions and to prevent conflict. We want the Commission for Equality and Human Rights to continue working in those areas. We also have a better understanding of how limited engagement and participation in civic life can impact on both the community concerned and on wider society. How can our civic institutions or elected representatives really deliver for society as a whole if, for example, disabled people or women are not engaged or are not able to participate in consultation and decision-making processes?
Research carried out by MORI has shown that personal contact among communities reduces the likelihood of prejudice and discrimination. Of course, we do not expect the commission to be an introduction agency, but we expect that it should use its unique position, working closely with local organisations and at a regional level—an issue that we discussed during Tuesday’s sitting—to bring together communities to build understanding, trust and respect.
The clause gives the commission an explicit role in bringing its experience and expertise to bear on facilitating the engagement of groups. We want the commission to use those powers wisely and successfully to strengthen society and promote and encourage good practice in fostering good relations among and within groups. A strong society relies, as the hon. Gentleman is, I am sure, aware, on more than just equal opportunities for individuals. It also requires strong communities, social conditions that foster a sense of belonging, respect for others, and a deeper understanding of our shared values and expectations. This clause enables the commission to play its part in those endeavours. I hope that I have answered the hon. Gentleman’s questions.

Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20 - Investigations

James Brokenshire: I beg to move amendment No. 78, in clause 20, page 11, line 2, after ‘suspects’, insert ‘on reasonable grounds’.

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 80, in clause 23, page 13, line 21, leave out ‘thinks’ and insert ‘is satisfied’.
No. 81, in clause 24, page 13, line 35, leave out ‘thinks’ and insert ‘believes on reasonable grounds’.
No. 82, in clause 25, page 14, line 19, leave out ‘thinks’ and insert ‘believes on reasonable grounds’.

James Brokenshire: The amendments are intended to gain greater clarity on the actions of the commission when it seeks to use enforcement powers or when entering into an agreement with a person suspected of committing an unlawful act, as defined in the Bill. Amendment No. 78 relates to clause 20(2) on the  commission’s investigatory powers and, specifically, to the wording on whether the commission suspects that the person concerned may have committed an unlawful act.
The amendment intends to ensure that the commission acts reasonably and responsibly. There is no suggestion that it would not do so, and I am sure that the Minister will confirm that the actions of the commission are intended to be reasonable and responsible. However, in seeking to insert the words “on reasonable grounds”, the amendment intends to give some assurance to the outside world that the commission will act in a reasonable manner, given the strength and power that it will have with regard to resources and funding. The amendment requires that, when the commission determines that it will investigate under clause 20, it will do so on a reasonable suspicion. We do not intend that, if a complaint is made to the commission, it should not take that complaint seriously. It is clear that it should do so; that is a responsibility and duty of the commission. However, it must consider such a complaint carefully before embarking on a full-scale investigation. Amendment No. 78, therefore, seeks to ensure that the Bill guarantees that the commission will act reasonably and that it will initiate an investigation only if it has reasonable grounds for suspicion.
Amendment No. 80 is concerned with clause 23. Various parts of the Bill are worded in terms of the commission’s “thinking” that something is the case. That is rather loose language in the context of a body comprising various individuals who have a collective thought process—an interesting concept in the light of our debate on legal personality. The amendment seeks clarity by substituting “is satisfied” in the context of a situation in which the commission might seek to enter into an agreement with a person whom it suspects of having been engaged in some form of unlawful act.
Clarification is necessary in that context. If the commission is to enter into an agreement with such a person, it needs to be satisfied whether the person has committed an unlawful act. Given that clause 23(3) refers to whether the commission thinks that a person has committed an unlawful act, I suspect that such an agreement would be admissible in evidence in any subsequent proceedings. The wording will give an indication that the agreement had been entered into in the first place on certain grounds, or as the result of a thought process. It is therefore important for the commission to satisfy itself that an unlawful act has been committed, rather than merely using loose wording that might not stand much scrutiny.
 Small businesses or individuals approached by the commission on the grounds that they should enter into agreements, because if they do not do so proceedings will be taken against them under the Bill, might feel that they are suffering from an inequality of arms and, therefore, being pressurised into entering into such agreements. It is incumbent on the commission, when  considering whether an agreement is the correct way to proceed, to satisfy itself that an unlawful act has been committed.
Amendment No. 81, too, relates to my problem with “thinks” in the context of the commission. It seeks to amend clause 24 to allow the commission to seek an injunction—again, if the commission “believes on reasonable grounds” that a person is likely to commit an unlawful act. That is an important power; the commission can stop unlawful acts and breaches of the equality laws. However, the commission must act reasonably, rather than on a whim. In terms of a court’s armoury, I remember having had an injunction described to me as being like a nuclear weapon. It is incumbent on the commission to act reasonably when deciding whether it should seek injunctive relief. To echo the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest, we must, as much as anything, ensure that we receive good value for money and that the commission considers its actions carefully when committing funds to such actions.
Amendment No. 82, in connection with clause 25, is on the same point again—
“Where the Commission thinks that a person has done an act to which this section applies”,
it may take certain action. The amendment again seeks to clarify whether the commission is doing so on the grounds of reasonable belief. Can the Minister clarify for us the cognitive processes of the commission and explain whether it has the ability to think in its own right?

Meg Munn: I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising these issues in such an interesting manner. He provides me with an opportunity to explain the background to the measures to which the amendments refer. If I have understood his remarks correctly, the amendments are intended to clarify the triggers for the commission’s enforcement powers in relation to investigations under clause 20, agreements under clause 23 and applications to court under clauses 24 and 25. They are also intended to ensure that the commission does not act in an unreasonable way.
I assure the hon. Gentleman and all members of the Committee that I entirely agree with those sentiments. We want the commission to be a respected, powerful and authoritative regulator that takes legal action as a final resort, directs its efforts strategically, rather than in a scattergun way and gives value for money. It is right that the commission’s enforcement powers should have serious consequences for the parties in question. As such, they should be exercised wisely and judiciously. On that basis, I can assure members of the Committee that the amendments are not necessary.
On amendment No. 78, we intend the commission to carry out an investigation only when it has reason to believe that the person concerned might have committed an unlawful act of discrimination or harassment. That is what the legal definition of suspects in the clause means; it is implicit that the suspicion must be on reasonable grounds.
Similarly, the Bill’s reference to “thinks” in clauses 23, 24 and 25 contains the same implicit requirement that the commission must have reasonable grounds on  which to form its view. It may be helpful to set out what might constitute reasonable grounds in relation to the amendments.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister may acknowledge that the use of the expression “reasonably suspects”—perhaps not quite the expression used by my hon. Friend—is quite common in legislation. What downside would there be to including it specifically so that anybody who looked at the Bill could see that that was indeed the test that should be applied? I appreciate the Minister’s point, and one can end up—this is rather like counting the angels dancing on the head of a pin—worrying about an exercise in semantics. However, it does not seem that any of the Bill’s thrust would be damaged by including “reasonably”, which, in my experience, appears quite frequently. I therefore wonder why it is not included.

Meg Munn: Clearly, we could have a long argument about that, and I certainly bow to the hon. Gentleman’s greater legal experience. However, I want to give examples of what we expect to be covered and to reassure the Committee that not including the words in the amendments in no way suggests that the suspicion should be on anything other than reasonable grounds. If the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr.d¤Grieve) wishes to do so, he can then come back on the point.
 It would not be helpful to specify what evidence would be sufficient. However, examples might include material that flows from an inquiry undertaken by the commission, material that has been put before a court or tribunal, which might have led to a decision or to a case being settled and proceedings being withdrawn, and information brought to the commission’s attention through helpline and advice services.
It would also be helpful to set out what would notd¤constitute reasonable grounds. A single unsubstantiated complaint is unlikely to be defensible, but several complaints over a long period, combined, for example, with a number of settled cases, are likely to be sufficient.
In addition to those safeguards, the commission is bound by principles of public administration law, which require it to act reasonably. The commission must therefore be able to justify its actions and show that they are reasonable and fair, or it will leave its decisions vulnerable to legal challenge.
 Public bodies are required to behave reasonably. Adding an express requirement of reasonableness in respect of one public body in one place would lead to unintended inferences being drawn from the absence of such requirements in other places. Eventually, we would have to include references to reasonableness in relation to every statutory duty and power on the statute book which would add unnecessarily to the length and complexity of individual provisions. There are some established and long-standing exceptions to that principle. In relation to constables, for example, reasonableness is often expressly provided for. That derives from the pre-statutory origins of the office of constable. As I said to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield a moment ago, I am sure that his legal  knowledge and experience goes much further than mine, but I am assured that it is not necessary to specify it in this position.
A successful challenge on reasonableness would damage the reputation of the commission, leading to reduced operational effectiveness and credibility with its stakeholders. We are confident that that is a risk the commission will not wish to take. I hope that I have reassured the hon. Member for Hornchurch (James Brokenshire) and his hon. Friends that we entirely agree about the intent of their amendments but do not believe that they are necessary. I ask him to withdraw the amendment,

James Brokenshire: I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation of the use of the terms that we highlighted in these amendments. I am obviously guided by the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for  Beaconsfield with his knowledge and experience of examining legislation such as this on the use of the reasonableness requirement in this context. In highlighting a number of the examples that should be taken into account and the procedures that should be adopted, the Minister guided the Committee on the steps that the commission would be expected to undertake. It is also helpful that her clear statement that the use of these terms would, of itself, denote reasonableness is on the record. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 21 to 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Dhanda.]
Adjourned accordingly at Fourteen minutes past Ten o’clock till this day at One o’clock.